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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant Bert Slavens appeals from a judgment
entered in the lower court wherein his answer was stricken for
failure to appear at his deposition and produce requested
documents.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a hearing on February 7, 1975, Judge Allen
B. Sorensen ordered Appellant's answer stricken, his default
entered, and a partial summary judgment to enter, which judgment order was signed March 10, 1975.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to sustain the entry of the
default and partial summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised in this appeal,
Respondents substantially accept the statement of facts of
Appellant with a few minor clarifications contained in the
argument and only wish to point out to the court a general
appearance was entered by Appellant through counsel Gary D.
Stott in the form of an answer (R. 11) and the motion for
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by mail
POINT I

IT W A S W I T H I N THE COURT'S POWER
A N D DISCRETION T O ENTER T H E D E FAULT JUDGMENT A G A I N S T A P P E L L A N T
Rule 3'-•-!' ^ R C P reads ^s : •> 1 1 o-w ,:
"If a party or an officer, director,
or managing agent of a party... fails (1) to
appear before the officer w h o is to take h i s
deposition, after being served with a proper
notice...the court in which the action is
pending o n motion may make such orders in
regard, to the failure as are just, and among
others it may take any action authorized
under paragraphs ( A ) , ( B ) , and (C) of subdivision • b x (2) o £ t h i s r u 1 e . "
(C) ol Lhe foregoing subsection re.-d*- • ;•.

*.'. !

"An order striking out pleadings UL
parts thereof, or staying further proceeds
until the order j s obeyed, or dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment b y default against the
disobedient party;"
A." pi • 1.11ued uuc ii, . \...ue] 1 ai 11 f s bi::i ef, Ru 1 e 3 7 (ci)
forniorlv re;,., \.nH] .Jnl^ "J

-;2,

"If a party or an officer or managing
agent of a party willfully fails to appear b e fore the officer w h o is to take h i s deposi tion.
( emphasis added )
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Since July A , " , n "

Uie Uf. ah Rule on appearance

for depositions Mas been identical co it* ; honqo i

-

•i

Federa . . .M-'-dines..' •- !:•> uie Federal Rnl.es of Civj I, Procedure,
therefore 1 , *he element o :

'• i lll.ulness" in AppeJlar f :"s m i s -

conduct 1 las no longer be- .
o*

• ^-^:-,ii

-nt l.o u- s ;. _ * ,e sanction'

: le current Pule ^7(P; ,ir.d ^ ; i s ; . -'

C) as quotes ab>vc.

With this b e i n g the present rule and ±n c,
o,_ b : i

'r-d. :..i:--

> •"

sc ' • »•-'

procedure; it w.jiu

that ai i •>; tne cases citoo in Appellant's hrief whirh
the elimination ( f the willful ruisconduc"
d . s i. sq i - .'. -i n;.!

:•

.-]
appear

predate

-.: s,!. -•••• • {.:.-

he rule now shonlu place the burden 3S

the defendant: to explain ^r justify his failure to adhere co
rules of p r o c e d u r e , • '
A p p e l l a n t ' s Point. I asserts !;he proposition

that

defendant Slavens' nonappearance was "not -. * illui" and it, w a s ,
therefore, error

s•

'..

*• ; L ,

C J ex .? e^sault iudgment.

No-

w h e r e in the recoiu in t-ii :_ s case ±s Lhere asy evidence to support sucl: i ai i assertion.

d-s published deposition, whieli i;3 puit

of tl le record i n tl: i.:i s ca i
"Mr.

. states a^ fojfows:

McRae:

May

i.t be further

stipulated

that B e r t Slavens is not present?
;. M r . Stott:
Mr. McRae:
w a s demanded

.. {.

So stipulate.
And

...s-. •

turihoi, that hi. pr—--n- e
. lt. notice of the taking uf

this deposition?
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Mr, Stot.L:

- „ .,-'_ in ay."

In view of the change :;.n the sanction aspect of
Rule 37, it, would appear that the more logical nil €* is as
contained ix i Jackson v. Kotzebue Oil Sales, 1"' FRD 204 at
206 wherein it was hold:

•

"No justifiable excuse appears or
has even been suggested as to why plaintiff's
previous interrogatories had not been answered,
which were served nearly three months before
the legislature convened.' 1
Tii.u. ;.;se, including t;ie record before thia co,et.
ia completely vc;h, o: an_\ justifiable excuse, attempu oi
by Appellant to ever appear

*i- "

t-r r •.!; ;;Osicion or to produce the

documents which wei e demanded, of him at the time of his scheduled appearance for deposition purposes.
stand or LaiL baaed on the record...

at Is a ope.;

.--'^a

For ohia proposition, see

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 9 7 , 3 69 p. 2a 4iJ,
which i s the only pronouncement by f h Ls cuui I interpreting
Ri i] e 3 i; , whereir :i thj s court stated:
"Inasmuch as i io transcript of what
transpired before the trial court on December 19,
1963, has been brought to us, it is to be presumed that the proceeding supports the judgment."
In

Moore ' s Federa 1 Practice, .. /-</' , I.s io-.v ': the

foJ 1 owing statement:
"Rule 37(d) makes it explicit that a
party properly served has aii absolute duty to
respond, that is, to present himself for the
taking of his deposition, or serve answers or
objections to interrogatories served upon him,
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or serve a response to requests for discovery under Rule 34, as the case may be, and
that the court in which the action is pending
may enforce this duty by imposing sanctions
for its violation. Rule 37(d) deals, then,
with failure to make the initial response required by the Rules while subdivisions (a) and
(b) provide a method of resolving differences
between the parties and enforcing the court's
determination. Thus there must be an order
under subdivision (a) before sanctions are
imposed under (b), while under (d) the party
aggrieved moves directly for the imposition
of sanctions."
Since under Tucker v. Nunley, supra, it is presumed
that the record and the proceedings in front of Judge Sorensen
support his findings of no justification having been offered
by Appellant for nonappearance, the "second chance" rule pleaded
by Appellant in his Point II should not be followed or even promulgated by this court as such a rule is in direct contravention
of the spirit of Rule 1 URCP and the intended sanctions promulgated by this court when the modifications to the discovery
rules were enacted and became effective July 1, 1972.
Appellant cites Schachtv. Janits, 53 F.R.D. 321,
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) and quotes alleged language from the case but
the case deals with change of venue, a motion to consolidate
cases, motions for force acceptance of service, to amend complaints and to enforce subpoenas. Other motions are also
raised but not one deals with any aspect of Rule 37. Furthermore, the language quoted is nonexistent.

It simply is not

anywhere in the opinion.
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Similarly, Lizak v. Zadrozny, 41 111 App. 1023,
283 N.E. 2d 252 (1972) is cited for the proposition that when
a deposition fails to be taken a second chance must be given
to the failing party. Appellant again cites language and,
again, no such language exists in the body of the opinion.
Furthermore, the case does not deal with depositions at all,
nor with any other aspect of discovery or Rule 37.
Cinelli v. Radcliffe, 35 A.D. 2d 829, 3317 N.Y.S.
2d 97 (1970) is perhaps the very best case that Appellant has
for his position.

This opinion is two paragraphs long and

gives no facts concerning the taking of the deposition or the
parties' reaction to it or the court's handling of the situation.

Certainly, the rule is too well settled that a holding

does not go beyond its facts to need citations, but if that is
not the rule, then Respondents cite Hubbard v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad, (6th Cir. 1975), 249 F. 2d 885, a three to four paragraph opinion with no facts that hold a judgment valid for
failure to appear.

The point is, as Appellant's own cases

show, the rule is not so simplistic. A failing party is not
always given a second chance except under very definite circumstances, for example:

In Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S. 2d

227 (Fla. 1973), the rule is not as mechanical as Appellant would
make it appear to be.

The language in Appellant's brief would

seem to support Cinelli, supra, unequivocally, except that the
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following paragraph of the opinion qualifies the rule:
"The principle (of granting a second
chance) would appear applicable where, as here,
the party who was initially disobedient promptly
offers compliance, which if made would serve the
purpose of the discovery without undue delay of
the action," (284 S. 2d at 227) (Emphasis added)
In Goldstein, supra, the failing party "promptly" agreed to
submit to a physical examination in time for the trial even
though at first she had refused on affidavit because of
emotional fear.

Gill v. Stolow, (2nd Cir. 1957) 240 F. 2d 669,

in dicta says the very same thing.

In that case, even though

the answer came at a very late date in the proceedings, since
the excuse was valid the court allowed a dismissal of the default judgment because there was a showing of attempted compliance in good faith and because plaintiff would not be prejudiced
by the delay.
Beal v. Reinertson, 298 Minn. 542, 215 N.W. 2d 57
(1974) is to the same effect.

The default was vacated because

there would really be no delay.

The order to produce, the re-

fusal to produce and the order of default were granted within
one month and the court felt that thirty days was neither a
great delay nor prejudicial to plaintiff, especially since the
failing party was willing to produce some things.
Rapoport v. Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A. 2d 424 (1965)
was decided on the basis that the record revealed that Sirott
was requesting that the order of deposition be vacated because
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he was under indictment in Pennsylvania and his appearance
there would prejudice him tremendously.

The appellate court

felt that on the basis of that affidavit Sirott should have
been granted a chance to appear at a hearing by counsel and
explain and the default judgment should not have been entered
without such a hearing.

It is also important that Sirott

agreed that he would take a deposition in Nevada, his state
of residence, or he would answer interrogatories.

On that

showing the court could not find Scott's nonappearance supportive of the default judgment.
In Bender v. Pfotenhauer, 21 111. App. 3d 127, 315
N.E. 2d 13 7 (1974) the appellate court sustained the lower
court's finding that appellant had not sustained "the burden
of establishing by affidavit or otherwise that his failure to
comply with the rules was warranted by extenuating circumstances
or events". At p. 139, although several attempts were made to
have Appeallant appear, there is no language at all in the case
that even mentions a "second chance" rule.

The entire case is

cast in terms of Appellant failing to excuse himself.
Appellant's final case authority under his Point II
is Housing Authority of City of Alameda v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App.
3rd 371, 102 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1972) which is more damaging to
his case than it is helpful.

In that case the lower court held

a hearing on the default judgment and the failing party's attorney
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appeared.

The appellate court upheld the default judgment

order because he was given an opportunity to explain the
failure to appear and all he did was give some vague, indefinable time that his client would appear and offered nothing
else.
From the above cases, it is clear that Appellant's
"second chancefr rule, as he applies it, is clearly erroneous.
The true rule as it emerges from the above case is as follows:
A.

If a party fails to appear or produce, default

judgment may be entered provided that:
!•" A hearing is held on the motion.
2.

Failing party is given a chance to

appear and explain.
3.

A second chance will be awarded when:
(a)

It will not prejudice the opposing

party.
(b)

Failing party has offered some

reason to exculpate his nonappearance.
B.

The appellate court will not overturn the lower

court's default judgment unless there is a clear showing of
abuse of discretion.

Virtually every case Appellant cites

states this rule.
The record would indicate that it is obvious Appellant
was aware of the progress in the case since, after belated at-
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tempts to get this matter before the trial court, Appellant
did appear with his present counsel at the December 20, 1974
pre-trial conference.

The record is further clear from the

transcript of that proceeding that no justification for Appellant's nonappearance is evident.
Respondents respectfully submit that this court should
disregard the cases decided under the old rule involving "willful" failure to appear and consider the obligations and duties
of parties under rules as they are presently enacted.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY
ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 56 URCP
In the court's findings in support of the judgment
entered in this case (R. 52), the court made the following
finding:
"Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment was set for oral argument on February 7, 1975,
at which time Robert M. McRae appeared for plaintiffs, Gary D. Stott appeared for defendant Perry,
and Rex Lewis appeared for defendant Slaven, and
the file containing no justification for the delays
in defendant Slaven1s appearance for the purposes
of being examined under oath in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor for his failure to produce documents, demand for which had
been served on his counsel of record, and no counteraffidavit or responsive pleading being of record,..."
This finding by the court dealt with the failure of
Appellant to rebut by affidavit or otherwise, as required by
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Rule 56, the amounts of money paid by plaintiffs to contractors who were pressing for payment of unpaid bills incurred
by defendants under the terms of the construction contract.
Rule 56(e) URCP states as follows:
"When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule,
(by affidavit) an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial."
Appellant did not respond to the affidavits of
plaintiff and the court for this additional reason properly
granted a judgment against Appellant as a defaulting party.
This rule has been discussed by this court on numerous occasions
and is clearly set forth in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation
Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274 at 279, 508 P. 2d 538.
CONCLUSION
Based on the modifications to Rule 37(d) URCP and
the elimination of the element of "willfulness" in nonappearance, the trial court was correct in striking Appellant's
answer and entering a default judgment.

This conclusion is

fairly supported by the lack of response or endeavor by Appellant to remedy his defaults prior to the February 7, 1975 hearing date.

Further, Appellant's failure to comply with Rule 56(d)
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in opposing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment warrants
the entry of the judgment in any event.
Respondents request this court to sustain the trial
court and to award Respondents their costs.
Respectfully submitted/
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON

Robert M. McRae
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
370 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed two (2) copies
of the foregoing brief to S. Rex Lewis, Attorney for DefendantAppellant, at 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, this 29th
day of August, 1975.
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